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Abstract
The paper attempts a critical assessment of both the theory and the empirical
evidence on the role of appropriability and in particular of Intellectual Property
Right (IPR) as incentives for technological innovation. We start with a critical
discussion of the standard justi¯cation of the attribution of IPR in terms of \market
failures" in knowledge generation. Such an approach we argue misses important
features of technological knowledge and also neglects the importance of non-market
institutions in the innovation process. Next, we examine the recent changes in the
IPR regimes and their in°uence upon both rates of patenting and underlying rates
of innovation. The evidence broadly suggests that, ¯rst, IPRs are not the most
important device apt to \pro¯t from innovation"; and second, they have at best no
impact, or possibly even a negative impact on the underlying rates of innovation.
Rather, we argued, technology- and industry-speci¯c patterns of innovation are
primarily driven by the opportunities associated with each technological paradigm.
Conversely, ¯rm-speci¯c abilities to seize them and \pro¯t from innovation" depend
partly on adequacy of the strategic combinations identi¯ed by the taxonomy of
Teece (1986) and partly on idiosyncratic capabilities embodied in the various ¯rms.
1 Introduction
This paper attempts a critical assessment of both theory and empirical evidence on the
role and consequences of the various modes of appropriation, with particular emphasis on
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), as incentives for technological innovation.
That pro¯t-motivated innovators are fundamental drivers of the \unbound Prometheus"
of modern capitalism (Landes 1969) has been well appreciated since Smith, Marx and,
later, Schumpeter. For a long time such an acknowledgment has come as an almost
self-evident \stylized fact". Finer concerns of the determinants of the propensity to in-
novate by entrepreneurs and business ¯rms came much later with the identi¯cation of a
1potentially quite general trade-o® underlying the economic exploitation of technological
knowledge: in so far as the latter is a non-rival and hardly excludable quasi-public good,
pure competitive markets are unable to generate a stream of quasi-rents su±cient to mo-
tivate pro¯t-seeking ¯rms to invest resources in its production (Arrow 1962). In order to
provide such incentives, a general condition is to depart from pure competition (as was
indeed quite naturally acknowledged by Smith, Marx and Schumpeter).
Granted that, however, what is empirically the extent of such a departure? And,
from a normative point of view, what is the desirable degree of appropriability able to
fuel a sustained °ow of innovations undertaken by business ¯rms? And through which
mechanisms? Moreover, what is the impact of di®erent institutional and technological
conditions upon the pro¯tability and competitive success of innovators themselves?
The latter angle is the one tackled in the seminal paper of David Teece (1986) who
argues that pro¯ts from innovation depend upon the interaction of three families of factors,
namely, appropriability regimes, complementary assets and the presence or absence of a
dominant paradigm. Note that, appropriability conditions, in addition to patent and
copyright protection, include secrecy, lead times, costs and time required for duplication,
learning, sales and service assets. Moreover, as Teece emphasizes, such appropriability
regimes are largely dictated by the nature of technological knowledge (Teece 1986, p.
287).
These fundamental observations on the mechanisms through which ¯rms \bene¯t from
innovation", however, have been lost in a good deal of contemporary literature on the
incentive to innovate, wherein, ¯rst, appropriability conditions are reduced almost exclu-
sively to IPR regimes, and, secondly, the award of IPR themselves is theoretically rooted
in a framework { in our view deeply misleading
{ namely that of \market failures".
In what follows we start from a critical assessment of such a perspective and of the
related notion of a monotonic relation between IP protection and rates of innovation
(section 2).
Next, after an overview of the recent changes in IPRs regimes (section 3), in section
4 we review the empirical evidence on the relationship between appropriability in general
and IP protection in particular, on the one hand, and rates of innovation on the other.
Such evidence, we shall argue, suggests that, ¯rst, appropriability conditions are just
one of several factors (possibly second order ones) shaping the propensity to innovate.
Together, the relative importance of the various factors and their interaction is highly
sector- and technology-speci¯c.
Second, appropriability is likely to display a threshold e®ect, meaning that a minimum
degree of appropriability is necessary to motivate innovative e®ort, but above such a
threshold further strengthening of appropriability conditions will not determine further
increases of R&D investments and rates of innovation. Rather, social ine±ciencies such as
2\anti-commons" e®ects (Heller and Eisenberg 1998), rent seeking behaviors, dissipation
of quasi-rents into litigation etc. are much more likely to emerge.
Third and relatedly, there seems to be no clear evidence of a positive relation between
the tightening of IPR regimes and the rates of innovation. Conversely, there is good
evidence on the (perverse) links between IPR protection and income distribution.
The rates of innovation, we suggest, fundamentally depend on paradigm-speci¯c op-
portunities rather than on mere appropriability conditions (at least above some threshold)
and even less so on the speci¯c subset of appropriability devices represented by legal IPR
protection.
Note that observed rates of innovation at the level of an industry or an economy are
only remotely related to any `equilibrium' rate of R&D investment by the \representative"
¯rm, whatever that means. Given whatever incentive pro¯le, one typically observes quite
varied search responses (as very roughly measured by R&D investments) and also quite
di®erent technological and economic outcomes, well beyond what a statistician would
interpret as independent realizations of the same underlying random process. We thus
conclude (section 5) that while the ¯rst order determinants of the rates of innovation rest
within the technology-speci¯c and sector-speci¯c opportunity conditions, the di®erential
ability of individual ¯rms to economically bene¯t from them stem from idiosyncratic
organizational capabilities.
But if this is the case, the answer to the question we ask in the title of this paper is
also straightforward: fueling the greed of innovators might be at best irrelevant for the
ensuing rates of innovation, while of course bad from a social point of view.
2 Some failures of the \market failure" arguments
The economic foundations of both theory and practice of IPRs rest upon a standard mar-
ket failure argument, without any explicit consideration of the characteristics of the knowl-
edge whose appropriation should be granted by patent or other forms of legal monopoly.
The proposition that a positive and uniform relation exists between innovation and
intensity of IP protection in the form of legally enforced rights such as patents holds only
relative to a speci¯c (and highly disputable) representation of markets, their functioning
and their \failures", on the one hand, and of knowledge and its nature on the other.
The argument falls within the realm of standard \Coasian" positive externality problem,
which can be brie°y stated in the following way. There exists a normative set of e±ciency
conditions under which markets perfectly ful¯ll their role of purely allocative mechanisms.
The lack of externalities is one of such conditions because their appearance amounts (as
with positive externalities) to under-investment and under-production of those goods
involved in the externality itself. Facing any departure from e±ciency conditions, a set
of policies and institutional devices must be put in place with the aim of re-establishing
3them in order to achieve social e±ciency. Knowledge generation is one of the loci entailing
such an externality: since knowledge is (to a good extent) a public good, it will be
underproduced and will receive insu±cient investments. Hence an arti¯cial scarcity is
created to amend non-rivalry and non-excludability in its use, yielding an appropriate
degree of appropriability of returns from investments in its production. The core of the
matter then becomes one of balancing out the detrimental e®ect of the deadweight loss
implied by a legally enforced monopoly, on the one hand, and the bene¯cial e®ect of
investments in R & D and more generally in knowledge generation, on the other.
A number of general considerations can be made about this argument.
First, the argument fundamentally rests on the existence of a theoretical (but hardly
relevant in terms of empirical and descriptive adequacy) benchmark of e±ciency against
which policy and institutional interventions should be compared as to their necessity and
e±cacy.
Second, the e±ciency notion employed is a strict notion of static e±ciency which
brings with it the idea that markets do nothing except (more or less e±ciently) allocate
resources.
Third, a most clear-cut distinction between market and non-market realms is assumed,
together with the idea that non market (policy, institutional) interventions can re-establish
perfect competition using purely market-based \tools".
Fourth, it is assumed that the nature of \knowledge" is totally captured by the notion
of \information" thus setting the possibility of institutionally treating it in uniform ways,
neglecting any dimension of knowledge which relates to its \non public good" features.
According to this perspective, the transformation of the public good \knowledge" in the
private good \patent" will perfectly set incentives for its production by way of legally
enforced conditions and possibilities of appropriability.
However, if one starts questioning that markets solely allocate resources one may begin
to consider them as performing a wider set of activities such as being the places in which
\novelty" is (imperfectly) produced, (imperfectly) tested and (imperfectly) selected. In
this alternative perspective, it becomes hard to reduce any e±ciency consideration to
static e±ciency so that, for instance, it is not necessarily true that allocative patterns
which are e±cient from a static perspective have the same property from a dynamical
point of view. It thus follows that the institutional attribution of property rights (whether
e±cient or not in a static allocative perspective) may strongly in°uence the patterns of
technological evolution in directions which are not necessarily optimal or even desirable.
In this sense, any question about the appropriate level of IP protection and degree of
appropriability would be better grounded on a theory of innovative opportunities and
productive knowledge (issues on which the theory of allocative e±ciency is rather silent:
cf. Winter (1982), Stiglitz (1994) from di®erent angles).
In addition, viewing markets as embedded and depending upon a whole ensemble
4of non-market institutions, allows to appreciate the fact that technological innovation is
highly dependent on a variety of complementary institutions (e.g. public agencies, public
policies, universities, communities and of course corporate organizations with their rich
inner structure) which can hardly be called \markets" and hardly can they be regulated by
pure market incentives. Precisely this institutional embeddedness of innovative activities
makes it very unlikely that a \market failure" approach such as the one we sketched
above could provide any satisfactory account of the relationship between appropriability
and propensity to innovate.
Finally, the (misleading) identi¯cation of knowledge with information (that is, the
deletion of any reference to cognitive and procedural devices whose role is to transform
sheer information into \useful knowledge" and which are to a large extent tacit and
embedded in organizations) makes one forget that processes through which new knowledge
is generated are strongly dependent on the speci¯cities of each technological paradigm
(which hardly can be reduced to \information" categories).
One question which seems to be rarely asked (and answered) in precise terms is: what
is (if any) the increase in the value of an innovation realized by way of patenting it? A
straightforward answer to this question would be: in a perfectly competitive market, any
innovation has no value (i.e. its price equals to zero) as its marginal cost of reproduction
equals zero. As a consequence, the whole and sole value of an innovation comes from its
being patented. Under this perspective, one is forced to conclude that a straightforward
positive relation exists between innovative activities and patents: a relation in which
patents are the one and only source of value of technological innovations (given perfect
competition). That is, in Teece's words, patents would be the only way of \pro¯ting from
technological innovation".
Under more careful scrutiny, however, this argument is subject to a series of limita-
tions and counter-examples. A ¯rst class of counter-arguments does arise from the many
instances of innovations that in spite of not being patented (or patented under very weak
patent regimes) have most de¯nitely produced considerable streams of economic value.
Relevant examples can be drawn from those technologies forming the core of ICT. For
instance, the transistor, while being patented from Bell Labs, was liberally licensed also
as a consequence of antitrust litigation and pressure from the US Justice Department: its
early producers nonetheless obtained enough revenue to be the seeds of the emergence of a
whole industry (Grandstrand 2005). The early growth of the semiconductor industry had
been driven to a good extent by public procurement in a weak IP regime. The software
industry, certainly a quite pro¯table one, similarly emerged under a weak IP regime. The
telecom industry was largely operated by national monopolies until the 90's who were
undertaking also a good deal of research, and IPRs played little role in the rapid advance
of technology in this industry. Mobile telephony also emerged under a weak IP regime
(until the late 1980s).
5We suggest indeed that strong IPRs did not play a pivotal role neither in the emergence
of ICT nor as a means of value generation. Quite on the contrary, in the early stage of
those sectors it might have been the very weakness of the patent regime that spurred their
rapid growth. Conversely, the strengthening of the IP regime in recent years (soon after
the ICT boom in the late 80's) might well have been (in terms of political in°uence) a
consequence rather than a cause of the fast pace at which the ICT sector expanded.
Back to our opening question, it is worth noting how (some) economists have been
at least cautious with respect to the adoption of the patent system as the only means to
foster innovative activity and to its uniform e®ectiveness. As Machlup (1958) put it: \If
we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it." Similar doubts are expressed in David
(1993) and David (2002)) who argues that IPR are not necessary for new technologies
and suggests that di®erent institutional mechanisms more similar to open science might
work more e±ciently.
Of course, the cautious economist is well aware that even from a purely theoretical
point of view, the innovation/patent relation is by no means a simple one. And similarly
tricky from a policy point of view is the identi¯cation of balance between gains and losses
of any system of intellectual property protection.
As a matter of fact, on the one hand it may be argued that intellectual property
monopolies a®orded by patents or copyright raise prices above unit production costs thus
diminishing the bene¯ts that consumers derive from using protected innovations. On
the other hand, the standard argument claim that the same rights provide a signi¯cant
incentive at producing new knowledge through costly investments in innovative research.
However, such a purported trade-o® might well apply also at the micro level. Whether
or not a ¯rm has the pro¯tability of its own innovations secured by IP rights, its R &
D behavior and its IPRs enforcement strategies cannot be una®ected by the actions of
other ¯rms acquiring and exploiting their own IP rights. The e®ect of ¯rms exploiting
IP rights invariably raises the costs that other ¯rms incur when trying to access and
utilize existing knowledge. Similar dilemmas apply to the e®ects of a strong IP system on
competition process. Static measures of competition may decrease when a monopoly right
is granted but dynamic measures could possibly increase if this right facilitates entry into
an industry by new and innovative ¯rms.
Are these trade-o®s general features of the relationship between static allocative ef-
¯ciency and dynamic/innovative e±ciency? There are good reasons to think that such
trade-o®s might not theoretically even appear in an evolutionary world, as Winter (1993)
shows.
On the grounds of a simple evolutionary model of innovation and imitation, Winter
6(1993) compares the properties of the dynamics of a simulated industry with and without
patent protection to the innovators. The results show that, ¯rst, under the patent regime
the total surplus (that is the total discovered present value of consumers' and producers'
surplus) is lower than under the non-patent one. Second and even more interestingly, the
non-patent regime yields signi¯cantly higher total investment in R&D and displays higher
best practice productivity.
More generally, an evolutionary interpretation of the relation between appropriability
and innovation is based on the premise that no model of invention and innovation and
no answer to patent policy question is possible without a reasonable account of inventive
and innovative opportunities and their nature.
The notion of technological paradigm (Dosi 1982), in this respect, is precisely an
attempt to account for the nature of innovative activities. There are few ideas associated
with the notion of paradigm worth recalling here.
First, note that any satisfactory description of \what technology is" and how it changes
must also embody the representation of the speci¯c forms of knowledge on which a par-
ticular activity is based and cannot be reduced to a set of well-de¯ned blueprints. It
primarily concerns problem-solving activities involving - to varying degrees - also tacit
forms of knowledge embodied in individuals and in organizational procedures. Second,
paradigms entail speci¯c heuristic and visions on "how to do things" and how to improve
them, often shared by the community of practitioners in each particular activity (engi-
neers, ¯rms, technical societies, etc.), i.e. they entail collectively shared cognitive frames.
Third, paradigms often also de¯ne basic templates of artifacts and systems, which over
time are progressively modi¯ed and improved. These basic artifacts can also be described
in terms of some fundamental technological and economic characteristics. For example,
in the case of an airplane, their basic attributes are described not only and obviously in
terms of inputs and production costs, but also on the basis of some salient technological
features such as wing-load, take-o® weight, speed, distance it can cover, etc. What is
interesting here is that technical progress seems to display patterns and invariances in
terms of these product characteristics. Hence the notion of technological trajectories as-
sociated with the progressive realization of the innovative opportunities underlying each
paradigm. In turn one of the fundamental implication of the existence of such trajecto-
ries is that each particular body of knowledge (each paradigm) shapes and constraints
the rates and direction of technical change, in a ¯rst rough approximation, irrespectively
of market inducements, and thus also irrespectively of appropriability conditions.
73 The growth in patenting rates and the (mis-)uses
of patent protection
Needless to say, such a lack of any robust theory-backed relation between appropriability
(and even less IPR forms of appropriability) and rates of innovation, puts the burden of
proof upon the actual empirical record.
Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed the broadening the patenting domain
including the application of \property" to scienti¯c research and its results. This has
been associated with an unprecedented increase in patenting rates. Between 1988 and
2000, patent applications from US corporations have more than doubled.
The relation between the two phenomena, however, and - even more important - their
economic implications are subject to signi¯cant controversy (for discussion, see Kortum
and Lerner (1998), Hall (2005), Lerner (2002), Ja®e and Lerner (2004) and Ja®e (2000)).
A ¯rst hypothesis is that the observed \patent explosion" has been linked to an anal-
ogously unprecedented explosion in the amount and quality of scienti¯c and technological
progress. A \hard" version of that hypothesis would claim that the increase of patents
has actually spurred the acceleration of innovation, which otherwise would have not taken
place. A \softer" version would instead maintain that the increase of patents has been an
e®ect rather than a cause of increased innovation, as the latter would have taken place
also with weaker protection.
The symmetrically opposite hypothesis is that the patent explosion is due to changes
both in the legal and institutional framework and in ¯rms' strategy with little relation to
the underlying innovative activities.
While it is di±cult to come to sharp conclusions in absence of counterfactual exper-
iments, some circumstantial evidence does lend some support to the latter hypothesis.
Certainly part of the growth in the number of patents is simply due to the expansion of
the patentability domain to new types of objects such as software, research tools, busi-
ness methods, genes and arti¯cially engineered organisms (see also Tirole (2002) on the
European case). Moreover, new actors have entered the patenting game, most notably
universities and public agencies (more on it in Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis
(2001)). Finally also corporate strategies vis-µ a-vis the legal claim of IPRs appear to have
signi¯cantly changed.
First, patents have acquired importance among the non physical assets of ¯rms as
means to signal the enterprise's value to potential investors, even well before the patented
knowledge has been embodied in any marketable good. Under this respect, the most
relevant institutional change is to be found in the so called \Alternative 2" under the
Nasdaq regulation (1984). This allowed \market entry and listing of ¯rms operating at a
de¯cit on the condition that they had considerable intangible capital composed of IPRs".
At the same time, patents seems to have acquired a strategic value, quite independently
8from any embodiment in pro¯table goods and even in those industries in which they
were considered nothing more than a minor by-product of R & D: extensive portfolios
of legal rights are considered means for entry deterrence (Hall and Ziedonis 2001) and
for infringement and counter infringement suits against rivals. Texas Instruments, for
instance, is estimated to have gained almost one billion dollars from patent licenses and
settlements resulting from its aggressive enforcement policy. It is interesting to note
that this practice has generated a new commercial strategy called \defensive publishing".
According to this practice, ¯rms who ¯nd too expensive to build an extensive portfolio
of patents tend to openly describe an invention in order to place it in the \prior art"
domain, thus preserving the option to employ that invention free from the interference of
anyone who might eventually patent the same idea.
Kortum and Lerner (1998) present a careful account of di®erent explanations of recent
massive increases in patenting rates, comparing di®erent interpretative hypothesis.
First, according to the \friendly court hypothesis", the balance between costs related
to the patenting process (in terms e.g. of loss of secrecy) and the value of the protection
that a patent a®ords to the innovator had been altered by an increase in the probability
of successful application granted by the establishment in the USA of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit existence (CAFC) specialized in patent cases - regarded by most
observers as a strongly pro-patent institution (cf. Merges (1996)).
Second, the \regulatory capture" tries to explain the surge of US patent applications
tracking it back to the fact that business ¯rms in general and in particular larger corpora-
tions (whose propensity to patent has traditionally been higher than average) succeeded in
inducing the US government to change patent policy in their favor by adopting a stronger
patent regime.
The third hypothesis grounds the interpretation into a general increase in \technologi-
cal opportunities" related, in particular, to the emergence of new technological paradigms
such as those concerning information technologies and biotechnologies.
Remarkably, Kortum and Lerner (1998) do not ¯nd any overwhelming support neither
for the political/institutional explanations nor for the latter one drawing the surge in
patenting to changes in the underlying technological opportunities. At the same time
there is a good evidence that the cost related to IP enforcement has gone up together
with the ¯rms' propensity to litigate: the number of patents suits instituted in the US
Federal Courts has increased from 795 in 1981 to 2573 in 2001. Quite naturally, this
has lead to signi¯cative increases in litigation expenditures. It has been estimated by
the US Department of Commerce that patent litigation begun in 1991 led to total legal
expenditures by US ¯rms that were at least 25% of the amount of basic research by these
¯rms in that year.
94 The blurred relations between appropriability and
innovation rates: some evidence
What is the e®ect of the increase in patent protection on R & D and technical advance?
Interestingly, also in this domain the evidence is far from conclusive. This is due at least
to two reasons. First, innovative environments are concurrently in°uenced by a variety
of di®erent factors which makes it di±cult (both for the scholar and the policy-maker)
to single out patent policy e®ects from e®ects due to other factors. Indeed, as we shall
argue below, a ¯rst order in°uence is likely to be exerted by the richness of opportunities
irrespectively of appropriality regimes. Second, as patents are just one of the means to
appropriate returns from innovative activity, changes in patent policy might often be of
limited e®ect.
At the same time also the in°uence of IPR regimes upon knowledge dissemination
appear to be ambiguous. Hortsmann, Mac Donald, and Slivinski (1985) highlight the
cases in which, on the one hand, the legally enforced monopoly rents should induce ¯rms
to patent a large part of their innovations, while, on the other hand, the costs related
to disclosure might well be greater than the gain eventually attainable from patenting.
In this respect, to our knowledge, not enough attention has been devoted to question
whether the di®usion of technical information embodied in inventions is enhanced or not
by the patent system.
The somewhat symmetric opposite issue concerns the costs involved in the imitation
of patent-protected innovations. In this respect, Mans¯eld, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981)
¯nd, ¯rst, that patents do indeed entail some signi¯cant imitation costs. Second, there are
remarkable intersectoral di®erences. For example, their data show a 30% in drugs, 20% in
chemicals and only 7% in electronics. In addition, they show that patent protection is not
essential for the development of at least three out of four patented innovations. Innovators
introduce new products notwithstanding the fact that other ¯rms will be able to imitate
those products at a fraction of the costs faced by the innovator. This happens both
because there are other barriers to entry and because innovations are felt to be pro¯table
in any case. Both Mans¯eld, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) and Mans¯eld (1986) suggest
that the absence of patent protection would have little impact on the innovative e®orts of
¯rms in most sectors. The e®ects of IPR regimes on the propensity to innovate are also
likely to depend upon the nature of innovations themselves and in particular whether they
are, so to speak, discrete \stand alone" events or \cumulative". So it is widely recognized
that the e®ect of patenting might turn out to be a deleterious one on innovation in the case
of strongly cumulative technologies in which each innovation builds on previous ones. As
Merges and Nelson (1994) and Scotchmer (1991) suggest, in this realm stronger patents
may represent an obstacle to valuable but potentially infringing research rather than an
incentive.
10Historical examples, such as those quoted by Merges and Nelson on the Selden patent
of a light gasoline in an internal combustion engine to power an automobile and the Wright
brothers patent on an e±cient stabilizing and steering system for °ying machines are good
cases to the point, showing how the IPR regime probably slowed down considerably the
subsequent development of automobiles and aircrafts. The current debate on property
rights in biotechnology suggests similar problems, whereby granting very broad claims on
patents might have a detrimental e®ect on the rate of innovation, insofar as they preclude
the exploration of alternative applications of the patented invention. This is particularly
the case with inventions concerning fundamental pieces of knowledge: good examples are
genes or the Leder and Stewart patent on a genetically engineered mouse that develops
cancer. To the extent that such techniques and knowledge are critical for further research
that proceeds cumulatively on the basis of the original invention, the attribution of broad
property rights might severely hamper further developments. Even more so if the patent
protects non only the product the inventors have achieved (the "onco-mouse") but all
the class of products that could be produced through that principle (\all transgenic non-
human mammals") or all the possible uses of a patented invention (say, a gene sequence),
even though they are not named in the application.
More generally, the evidence suggests that the patents/innovation relation depends on
the very nature of industry-speci¯c knowledge bases, on industry stages in their life-cycles
and on the forms of corporate organizations.
Di®erent surveys highlight, ¯rst, such intersectoral di®erences and second, on average,
the limited e®ectiveness of patents as an appropriability device for purpose of \pro¯ting
from innovation". Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987), for instance, reports that
patents are by and large viewed as less important than learning curve advantages and lead
time in order to protect product innovation and the least e®ective among appropriability
means as far as process innovations are concerned (see Table 1).
Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) present a follow-up to Levin, Klevorick, Nelson,
and Winter (1987) just cited addressing also the impact of patenting on the incentive
to undertake R & D. Again, they report on the relative importance of the variety of
mechanisms used by ¯rms to protect their innovations - including secrecy, lead time,
complementary capabilities and patents - again Table 1. The percentage of innovations
for which a factor is e®ective in protecting competitive advantage deriving from them is
thus measured. The main ¯nding is that, as far as product innovations are concerned, the
most e®ective mechanisms are secrecy and lead time while patents are the least e®ective,
with the partial exception of drugs and medical equipment. Moreover the reasons for
the \not patenting" choice are reported to be (i) demonstration of novelty (32%), (ii)
information disclosure (24%) and (iii) ease of inventing around (25%).
The uses of patents di®er also relative to \complex" and \discrete" product industries.
Complex products industries are those in which a product is protected by a big number of
111A. Product Innovation
Mechanism 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994
Patents 4 7 3 5 17 7 9 4
Secrecy 0 13 0 11 11 2 22 5
Lead Time 14 10 14 8 5 7 0 7
Sales & Service 16 4 16 4 1 7 0 10
Manufacturing n.a. 3 n.a. 3 n.a. 14 n.a. 7
1B. Process Innovation
Mechanism 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994
Patents 2 1 4 5 3 3 24 16
Secrecy 2 21 10 10 19 1 2 0
Lead Time 26 3 5 7 2 16 0 3
Sales & Service 4 0 16 0 7 3 6 11
Manufacturing n.a. 10 n.a. 12 n.a. 10 n.a. 0
Table 1: E®ectiveness of Appropriability Mechanism in Product and Process Innovations, 1983 and
1994, Surveys, USA, 33 Manufacturing Industries. Table 1.A Product Innovations. Table 1B. Process
Innovations. Sources: Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) as presented in Winter (2002) (n.a.
for observations not available).
patents while discrete product industries are those in which a product is relatively simple
and therefore associated with a small number of patents. In complex product industries,
patents are used to block rival use of components and acquire bargaining strength in
cross-licensing negotiations. In discrete product industries, patents are used to block
substitutes by creating patent \fences" (cf. Gallini (2002), Ziedonis (2004)).
It is interesting also to compare Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh's (2000) with the old Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) which came before the changes in the IPR regime
and before the massive increase in patenting rates. Still, also in Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh (2000) patents are not reported to be the key means to appropriate returns from
innovations in most industries. Secrecy, lead time and complementary capabilities are
often perceived more important appropriability mechanisms.
It could well be that a good deal of the increasing patenting activities over the last two
decades might have gone into \building fences" around some key invention thus possibly
raising the private rate of return to patenting itself (Ja®e (2000)) without however bearing
any signi¯cant relation with the underlying rates of innovation. This is consistent also
with the evidence discussed in Lerner (2002) who shows that the growth in (real) R & D
spending predates the strengthening of the IP regime.
The apparent lack of e®ects of di®erent IPR regimes upon the rates of innovation
appears also from broad historical comparisons. So for example, based on the analysis of
data from the catalogues of two 19th century world fairs: the Crystal Palace Exhibition in
London in 1851, and the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876, Moser (2003) ¯nds
12no evidence that countries with stronger IP protection produced more innovations than
those with weaker IP protection and a strong evidence of the in°uence of IP law on sectoral
distribution of innovations. In weak IP countries ¯rms did innovate in sectors in which
other forms of appropriation (e.g. secrecy and lead time) were more e®ective, whereas in
countries with strong IP protection signi¯cantly more innovative e®ort went to the sectors
in which these other forms were less e®ective. Hence, the interesting conclusion that can
be drawn from Moser's study that patents' main e®ect could well be on the directions
rather than on the rates of innovative activity.
The relationship between investment in search and innovative outcomes is explored at
length in Hall and Ziedonis (2001) in the case of the semiconductor industry. In this sector,
the little role and e®ectiveness of patents - related to short product life-cycles and fast-
paced innovation which make secrecy and lead time much more e®ective appropriability
mechanisms - also makes the surge in patenting (dating back to the 80's) particularly
striking. As Hall and Zidonis report, in the semiconductor industry patenting per R&D
dollar doubled over the period 1982-92. (Incidentally note that, over the same period,
patenting rates in the US were stable in manufacturing as a whole and did decline in
pharmaceuticals).
Semiconductors are indeed a high-opportunity sector whose relatively low propensity
to patent is fundamentally due to the characteristic of the knowledge base of the industry.
Thus it could well be that the growth in patents might have been associated with the use
of patents as \bargaining chips" in the exchanges of technology among di®erent ¯rms.
Such a use of (low quality) patents - as Winter (2002) suggests - might be a rather
di®used phenomenon: when patents are used as \bargaining chips" i.e. as \the currency
of technology deals" all the \standard requirements" about such issues as non obviousness,
usefulness, novelty, articulability (you can't patent an intuition), reducibility to practice
(you can't patent an idea per se), observability in use, turn out to be much less relevant.
In Winter's terms, \if the relevant test of a patent's value is what it is worth in exchange,
then it is worth about what people think it is worth { like any paper currency. \Wildcat
patents"1 work reasonably well to facilitate exchanges of technology. So, why should we
worry?" One of the worries, concerns the \tragedy of anti-commons". While the quality
of patents lowers and their use bear very little link with the requirements of stimulating
the production and di®usion of knowledge, the costs devoted to untie con°icting and
overlapping claims on IP are likely to increase together with the uncertainty about the
extent of legal liability in using knowledge inputs. Hence, as convincingly argued by
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Heller (1998) a \tragedy of anti-commons" is likely to
emerge wherein the IP regime gives too many subjects the right to exclude others from
using fragmented and overlapping pieces of knowledge with no one having ultimately the
1Winter here is pursuing an analogy between patents and \wildcat banknotes" in the US free banking
period (1837-1865).
13e®ective privilege of use.
In these circumstances, the proliferation of patents might turn out to have the e®ect
of discouraging innovation. One of by products of the recent surge in patenting is that, in
several domains, knowledge has been so ¯nely sub-divided into separate property claims
(on essentially complementary pieces of information) that the cost of reassembling con-
stituent parts/properties in order to engage in further research charges a heavy burden
on technological advance. This means that a large number of costly negotiations might
be needed in order to secure critical licenses, with the e®ect discouraging the pursue of
certain classes of research projects (e.g. high risk exploratory projects). Ironically, Barton
(2000) notes that \the number of intellectual property lawyers is growing faster than the
amount of research".
While it is not yet clear how widespread are the foregoing phenomena of a negative in-
°uence of strengthen IPR protection upon the rates of innovation, a good deal of evidences
does suggest that, at the very least, no monotonic relation is there between IPR protec-
tion and propensity to innovate. So, for example, Bessen and Maskin (2000) observe that
computers and semi-conductors while having been among the most innovative industries
in the last forty years, have historically had weak patent protection and rapid imitation of
their products. It is well known that the software industry in the US experienced a rapid
strengthening of patent protection in the 80's. Bessen and Maskin suggest that \far from
unleashing a °urry of new innovative activity, these stronger rights ushered in a period in
which R&D spending leveled o®, if not declined, in the most patent-intensive industries
and ¯rms". The idea is that in industries like software, imitation might be promoting
innovation and that, on the other hand, strong patents might inhibit it. Bessen and
Maskin argue that this phenomenon is likely to occur in those industries characterized by
a relevant degree of sequentiality (each innovation builds on a previous one) and comple-
mentarity (the simultaneous existence of di®erent research lines enhances the probability
that a goal might be eventually reached). A patent, in this perspective, actually prevents
non-holders from the use of the idea (or of similar ideas) protected by the patent itself
and in a sequential world full of complementarities this turns out to slowdown innovation
rates. Conversely, it might well happen that ¯rms would be better o® in an environment
characterized by easy imitation, whereby it would be true that imitation would reduce
current pro¯ts but it would be also true that easy imitation would raise the probability
of further innovation to take place and of further pro¯table innovations to be realized.
A related but distinct question concerns the relationship between IPR's, the existence
of markets for technologies and the rates of innovation and di®usion (see Arora, Fosfuri,
and Gambardella (2001) for a detailed analysis of the developments ). While it is certainly
true that some IPR protection is often a necessary condition for the development of
markets for technologies, no clear evidence is there suggesting that more protection means
more market. And neither there is general evidence that more market drives higher rates
14of innovation. Rather, the degree to which technological di®usion occurs via market
exchange depend to a great extent on the nature of technological knowledge itself, e.g. its
degree of codi¯ability (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001).
So far we have primarily discussed the relations between the regimes of IPR protection
and rates of innovations, basically concluding that either the relation is not there, or, if
it is there it might be a perverse one, with strong IPR enforcement actually deterring
innovative e®orts. However we know also that IPT protection is only one of the mechanism
for appropriating returns from innovation, and certainly not the most important one.
What about then the impact of appropriability in general?
Considering together the evidence on appropriability from survey data and (cf. Co-
hen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) and Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987)), the
cross-sectoral evidence on technological opportunities (cf. Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, and
Winter (1995)) and the evidence from multiple sources on the modes, rates and directions
of innovation (for two surveys, cf. Dosi (1988) and Dosi, Orsenigo, and Sylos Labini
(2005)), the broadbrush conclusion is that also appropriability conditions in general have
only a limited e®ects on the pattern of innovation, if any. This clearly applies above
a minimum threshold: with perfectly zero appropriability, the incentive to innovate for
private actors would vanish, but with few exceptions such strict zero condition is hardly
ever encountered. And the threshold, as the open source software shows might be indeed
very low.
5 Opportunities, capabilities, and greed: some con-
clusions on the drivers of innovation and its private
appropriation
There are some basic messages from the foregoing discussion of the theory and empirical
evidence on the relationship between degrees of IPR protection and rates of innovation.
The obvious premise is that some private expectation of \pro¯ting from innovation"
is and has been throughout the history of modern capitalism a necessary condition for
entrepreneurs and business ¯rms in order to undertake expensive and time-consuming
search for innovations themselves. That was already well clear to classical economists and
has been quite uncontroversial since.
However, having acknowledged that, there are neither strong theoretical reasons nor
any strong empirical evidence suggesting that tuning up or down appropriability mecha-
nisms of innovations, in general, and appropriability by means of IPR in particular, has
any robust e®ect upon the resources which private self-seeking agents devote to innova-
tive search and upon the rates at which they discover new products and new production
processes. As pointed out by the already mentioned survey by Ja®e (2000) on the e®ects
of the changes in IPR regimes in recent years \there is little empirical evidence that what
15is widely perceived to be a signi¯cant strengthening of intellectual property protection
had signi¯cant impact on the innovation process" (Ja®e (2000), p. 540).
Note that any tightening of IPR is bound to come together with a fall in \consumer
surplus": making use somewhat uneasily of such static tool for welfare analysis, it is
straightforward that as producers' rents and prices on innovation grow, the former must
fall. Conversely, on the producers' side, \to the extent that ¯rms' attention and resources
are, at the margin, diverted from innovation itself toward the acquisition, defense and
assertion against others of property rights, the social return to the endeavor as a whole is
likely to fall. While the evidence on all sides is scant, it is fair to say that there is at least
much evidence of these e®ects of patent policy changes as there is evidence of stimulation
of research" (Ja®e (2000), p. 555).
But if IPR regimes has at best second order e®ects upon the rates of innovation what
are the main determinants of the rates and directions of innovation?
Our basic answer, as argued above and elsewhere (cf. Dosi (1988), Dosi (1997), Dosi,
Orsenigo, and Sylos Labini (2005)) is the following. The fundamental determinants of
observed rates of innovation in individual industries/technologies appear to be nested in
levels of opportunities which each industry faces. \Opportunities" capture, so to speak,
the width, depth and richness of the sea in which incumbents and entrants go ¯shing
for innovation. In turn, such opportunities are partly generated by research institutions
outside the business sector, partly stem from the very search e®orts undertaken by incum-
bent ¯rms in the past and partly °ow through the economic system via suppliers/users
relationships (see the detailed intersectoral comparisons in Pavitt (1984) and in Klevorick,
Levin, Nelson, and Winter (1995)). Given whatever level of innovative opportunities typi-
cally associated with particular technological paradigms, there seem to be no general lack
of appropriability conditions deterring ¯rms from going out and ¯shing in the sea. Sim-
ply, appropriability conditions vary a lot across sectors and across technologies, precisely
as highlighted by the paper by David Teece which this special issue of Research Policy
celebrates. Indeed, one of the major contributions of that work is to build a taxonomy
of strategies and organizational forms and map them into the characteristics of knowl-
edge bases, production technologies and markets of the particular activity in which the
innovative/imitative ¯rms operates.
As these \dominant" modes of appropriation of the returns from innovation vary across
activities, so should also vary the \packets" of winning strategies and organizational forms:
in fact, this Teece's challenging conjecture still awaits a thorough statistical validation on
a relatively large sample of statistical successes and failures.
Note also that Teece's taxonomy runs counter any standard standard \IPR-leads-to-
pro¯tability" model according to which turning the tap of IPR ought to change returns
up or down rather uniformly for all ¯rms (except for noise), at least within single sec-
tors. Thus, the theory is totally mute with respect to the enormous variability across
16¯rms even within the same sector and under identical IPR regimes, in terms of rates of
innovation, production e±ciencies and pro¯tabilities (a discussion of such evidence is in
Dosi, Orsenigo, and Sylos Labini (2005)).
The descriptive side { as distinguished from the normative \strategic" one { of the
interpretation by Teece (1986) puts forward a promising candidate in order to begin
to account for the patterns of successes and failures in terms of suitability of di®erent
strategies/organizational arrangements to knowledge and market conditions. However,
Teece himself would certainly agree that such interpretation could go only part of the
way in accounting for the enormous inter-¯rm variability in innovative and economic
performances and their persistence over time.
A priori, good candidates for an explanation of the striking di®erences across ¯rms
even within the same line of business in their ability to both innovate and pro¯t from
innovation ought to include ¯rm-speci¯c features which are su±ciently inertial over time
and only limitedly \plastic" to strategic manipulation so that they can be considered,
at least in the short term, \state variables" rather than \control variables" for the ¯rm
(Winter 1987). In fact, an emerging capability-based theory of the ¯rm to which Teece
himself powerfully contributed (cfr. Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and Winter (1990), and Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen (1997)), identi¯es a fundamental source of di®erentiation across ¯rms
in their distinct problem-solving knowledge yielding di®erent abilities of \doing things"
{ searching, developing new products, manufacturing, etc. (see Dosi, Nelson, and Winter
(2000) among many distinguished others). Successful corporations, as one argues at more
detail in the introduction to the Dosi, Nelson, and Winter (2000), derive competitive
strength from their above-average performance in a small number of capability clusters
where they can sustain a leadership. Symmetrically, laggard ¯rms often ¯nd hard the
imitation of perceived best-practice production technologies because of the di±culty of
identifying the combination of routines and organizational traits which makes company x
good at doing z.
Such barriers to learning and imitation, it must be emphasized, have very little to do
with any legal regime governing the access to the use of supposedly publicly disclosed
but legally restricted knowledge such as that associated with patent-related information.
Much more fundamentally, it relates to collective practices which in every organization
guide innovative search, production and so on. In fact, in our view, given the opportunities
for innovation associated with a particular paradigm - which approximately determine
also the ensuing industry-speci¯c rates of innovation - who wins and who looses amongst
the ¯rms operating within that industry depends on both the adequacy of their strategic
choices - along the lines of the taxonomy of Teece (1986) - and on the type of idiosyncratic
capabilities that they embody. In our earlier metaphor, while the\rates of ¯shing" depend
essentially on the size and richness of the sea, idiosyncratic di®erences in the rates of
success in the ¯shing activity itself, depend to a large extent on ¯rm-speci¯c capabilities.
17Moreover, the latter, jointly with complementary assets fundamentally a®ects also the
ability to \pro¯t from innovation". Conversely, if we are right, this whole story has
very little to do with any change in the degrees to which society feeds the greed of the
¯shermen, in terms of prices they are allowed to charge for their catch. That is, out of
metaphor, the tuning of IPR-related incentives is likely to have only second order e®ects,
if any, while opportunities together with the capabilities of seeing them are likely to be
the major drivers of the collective \unbound Prometheus" of modern capitalism and also
to shape the ability of individual innovators to bene¯t from it.
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